Letný semester 2008/09
1. (18.2.2009) Michal Rjaško: Non-Trivial Robust Combiners for Collision Resistant Hash
Functions don't exist
A (k,l)-robust combiner for collision resistant hash functions is a construction, which takes
l hash functions and combines them so that if at least k of the components are collision resistant,
then so is the resulting combination. A black-box (k,l)-robust combiner is robust combiner, which
takes its components as black-boxes. A trivial black-box combiner is concatenation of any (l-k+1)
of the hash functions. Boneh and Boyen followed by Pietrzak proved, that for collision resistance
we cannot do much better that concatenation, i.e. there does not exist black box (k,l)-robust
combiner for collision resistance, whose output is significantly shorter that the output of the
trivial combiner. We discuss the proof of this result.
2. (4.3.2009) Martin Stanek: Inkrementálne hašovanie a zovšeobecnený narodeninový útok
V prezentácii predstavíme myšlienku inkrementálneho hašovanie, vrátane konštrukcií XORHASH a AdHASH
(a jej modifikácií). Ukážeme útoku na konštrukciu XORHASH. V ďalšom prezentujeme zovšeobecnený
narodeninový útok a jeho aplikáciu na útoky na inkrementálne hašovanie. Prezentácia vychádza z prác:
M. Bellare, D. Micciancio: A New Paradigm for collision-free hashing: Incrementality at
reduced cost (1997) a práce D. Wagner A generalized birthday problem (2002)
3. (18.3.2009) Peter Košinár: All-or-nothing Transforms
Standard cryptographic definitions and constructions do not guarantee any
security even if a tiny fraction of the secret entity is compromised.
We'll demonstrate a few ways of building cryptographic primitives that
remain provably secure even when an adversary is able to learn almost the
entire secret.
4. (29.4.2009) Michal Rjaško: Randomized Hashing
Recent attacks on collision resistant hash functions have shown, that creating collision
resistant hash function (CRHF) is a hard task. Very important application of CRHF are digital
signatures. In 2007, Halevi and Krawczyk proposed a randomized mode of operation for hash
functions, which frees digital signatures from dependency on full collision resistance. They
presented two schemes, which are easy to implement in current signature schemes, and proved they
security under second-preimage-like assumption for compression function. In the presentation we
discuss this result.