

Message authentication codes

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Introduction

- ▶ message authentication code (MAC)
 - ▶ data integrity and authenticity
 - ▶ faster than digital signatures, suitable for network protocols
 - ▶ shared-key (symmetric) construction

$$A \xrightarrow{m, \text{Mac}_k(m)} B$$


- ▶ MAC ~ “hash function with a key”
 - ▶ key is necessary to compute the value of MAC
 - ▶ verification by recomputation and comparison
 - ▶ no non-repudiation property (!)
- ▶ requirements: efficiency & security
- ▶ remark: using MAC alone does not prevent replay attacks (!)
 - ▶ sequential message number, timestamp, etc.

Security of MAC (informally)

- ▶ formal definition of MAC uses three algorithms: Gen, Mac, Vrf
- ▶ PPT attacker A , with oracle access to Mac_k (for random k)
- ▶ existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack:
 - ▶ the probability that any attacker A produces a pair (m, h) such that $\text{Mac}_k(m) = h$ (and A did not query the oracle with m) is negligible
- ▶ MAC uses a key, therefore the birthday attack is not applicable
 - ▶ output of MAC can be shorter than output of a hash function
 - ▶ for example IPSec: HMAC-SHA1-96 (truncated HMAC)

CBC-MAC

- ▶ MAC constructed from a block cipher
- ▶ initial attempt:



- ▶ secure for fixed length inputs (assuming PRP property of E)

CBC-MAC (2)

► insecure for variable length inputs:


1. A queries Mac_k oracle with 1-block messages m and m'
2. A obtains $h = \text{Mac}_k(m) = E_k(m)$ and $h' = \text{Mac}_k(m') = E_k(m')$
3. A queries the oracle with two-block message $m || x$ and obtains $h^* = E_k(E_k(m) \oplus x)$
4. Let us compute MAC for two-block message $m' || h \oplus h' \oplus x$:

$$E_k(E_k(m') \oplus E_k(m) \oplus E_k(m') \oplus x) = E_k(E_k(m) \oplus x) = h^*$$

i.e. A knows the valid MAC for this message without asking the oracle

CBC-MAC (3)

- ▶ how to fix CBC-MAC:



- ▶ two different keys k, k'
 - ▶ derive k' from k , e.g. $k' = \bar{k}$, $k' = E_k(k) \dots$
 - ▶ or derive two keys from a single key: $k_1 = E_k(1)$, $k_2 = E_k(2)$

- ▶ authentication mode of block ciphers, approved by NIST (SP 800-38B)
- ▶ simplified presentation
 - ▶ assuming that the input length is divisible by block length (padding and slightly different subkey used otherwise)
 - ▶ $m = m_1, \dots, m_t$
 - ▶ $l = E_k(0); k_1 = \text{MSB}(l) ? (l \ll 1) \oplus R : l \ll 1$
 - ▶ R is a constant depending on block length, e.g. $R_{128} = 0^{120}10000111$
 - ▶ the last block is transformed: $m'_t = m_t \oplus k_1$
- ▶ CBC processing (starting with $C_0 = 0$):
 1. $C_i = E_k(C_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$, for $i = 1, \dots, t-1$
 2. $C_t = E_k(C_{t-1} \oplus m'_t)$ final round
 3. output: C_t (can be truncated)

MAC construction based on hash functions

- ▶ natural but (often) insecure approaches (let H be a hash function):
 1. $\text{Mac}_k(m) = H(k \parallel m)$
using some iterated H (e.g. MD-based) allows the attacker to compute MAC for an extended message
 2. $\text{Mac}_k(m) = H(m \parallel k)$
using some iterated H (e.g. MD-based) means that finding collision implies colliding MAC (security of MAC reduces/weakens to collision resistance)

easy to propose other ideas, e.g. $H(k \parallel m \parallel k)$...security proof?
(btw. some weaknesses were identified even in this construction)

HMAC

- ▶ MAC construction based on hash functions
- ▶ the most popular / used MAC today (SSL/TLS, SSH, IPSec, ...)
- ▶ provable security (if underlying compression function is PRF)
- ▶ construction:

$$\text{HMAC}_k(m) = H(k \oplus \text{opad} \parallel H(k \oplus \text{ipad} \parallel m))$$


- ▶ opad/ipad – block-length outer/inner padding (0x5c5c.../ 0x3636...), i.e. 64 bytes for MD5, SHA-1 or SHA-256
- ▶ almost as fast as underlying hash function (just 3 additional blocks)
- ▶ truncation of output possible (e.g. used in IPSec)

Combined construction

- ▶ another approach: $\text{Mac}_k(m) = E_k(H(m))$
- ▶ provable security, if E is PRP and H is collision resistant
- ▶ problems:
 - ▶ stronger assumptions than HMAC (thus no reason to use it)
 - ▶ block ciphers usually with short block length n and because of collisions, the bit-security is just $n/2$
 - ▶ for example AES with 128-bit block (and truncated hash) leads to 64-bit security

MAC from sponge construction

- ▶ KMAC – Keccak MAC (NIST SP 800-185, 2016)
- ▶ basic idea of MAC from sponge hash function:



Secure channel

- ▶ confidentiality & integrity/authenticity
- ▶ usually both needed for a secure communication
- ▶ authenticated encryption – specific modes of a block cipher
- ▶ encryption (standard confidentiality modes) & MAC
 - ▶ How to combine them properly?
- ▶ options (we use two independent keys k_1, k_2):
 1. EtM (Encrypt then MAC, e.g. IPsec): $c = E_{k_1}(m), \langle c, \text{Mac}_{k_2}(c) \rangle$
 2. MtE (MAC then Encrypt, e.g. SSL/TLS): $E_{k_1}(m \parallel \text{Mac}_{k_2}(m))$
 3. E&M (Encrypt and MAC, e.g. SSH): $\langle E_{k_1}(m), \text{Mac}_{k_2}(m) \rangle$
- ▶ theory: EtM is the correct approach (others *can* be made secure)
- ▶ AEAD ciphers are prioritized nowadays
 - ▶ SSL: authenticated encryption (GCM); only AEAD ciphers for TLS 1.3
 - ▶ SSH: authenticated encryption (GCM): e.g. `aes128-gcm@openssh.com`