

# Cryptographic protocols – introduction

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# Content

## Introduction

### Some protocols and basic notions

- Diffie-Hellman protocol

- Interlock protocol

- Dolev-Yao model

- Freshness – nonces and timestamps

### Basic protocols and attacks

- Needham-Schroeder protocol

### Attacks

- Replay attacks and symmetry – WMF, NSPK

- Implementation issues (Otway-Rees)

- Denning-Sacco protocol

# Introduction

- ▶ cryptographic protocols
  - ▶ goals: secrecy, authentication, integrity, anonymity, unlinkability, ...
  - ▶ environment: untrusted channels, dishonest participants
- ▶ our focus: authentication and key agreement (session-key)
- ▶ session-key
  - ▶ less data for cryptanalysis
  - ▶ logical separation of data from different sessions
  - ▶ using symmetric constructions for confidentiality and authenticity
- ▶ IPsec (IKE), TLS (handshake), SSH, WPA3 (SAE/Dragonfly), Noise Protocol Framework, ...
- ▶ prerequisite for secure communication
- ▶ various proposals (requirements, capabilities, environment)
- ▶ other protocols (not discussed here):
  - ▶ voting, money, private information retrieval, multiparty computation, etc.

# Diffie-Hellman protocol

- ▶ two principals  $A, B$
- ▶ shared group  $G$  of prime order  $q$  with generator  $g$ 
  - ▶ public, known to everyone (e.g. an attacker)
- ▶ goal: key agreement
- ▶ DH protocol:
  1.  $A \rightarrow B: g^a$ , for random  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A: g^b$ , for random  $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
  - ▶  $A$  computes  $K = (g^b)^a = g^{ab}$ , and  $B$  computes  $K = (g^a)^b = g^{ab}$
  - ▶ the shared secret can be used to derive a symmetric key(s)
- ▶ passive adversary: CDH problem  $g^a, g^b \rightarrow g^{ab}$

# MITM attack

- ▶ active adversary in DH protocol
  - ▶ can intercept and change messages
- ▶ man-in-the-middle attack ( $M$  is an attacker):
  1.  $A \rightarrow M(B): g^a$
  2.  $M(A) \rightarrow B: g^x$
  3.  $B \rightarrow M(A): g^b$
  4.  $M(B) \rightarrow A: g^y$
  - ▶  $A$  computes  $K_A = g^{ay}$ ,  $B$  computes  $K_B = g^{xb}$
  - ▶  $M$  can compute  $K_A = (g^a)^y = g^{ay}$  as well as  $K_B = (g^b)^x = g^{bx}$
  - ▶  $M$  can “translate” messages between  $A$  and  $B$  (or create his/her own)
- ▶ Can  $M$  enforce  $K_A = K_B$  in the MITM attack?
  - ▶ if not,  $M$  should be there till the end or “simulate” a connection error
  - ▶  $g^x = g^y = 1 \Rightarrow K_A = K_B = 1$

# Fixing DH protocol

- ▶ authenticate messages in the protocol
- ▶ additional assumptions – PKI (distribution of authentic public keys), preshared secrets, etc.
- ▶ DH in various forms is a base for majority of key agreement protocols
- ▶ Station-to-Station protocol:
  1.  $A \rightarrow B: g^a$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A: g^b, \text{Cert}_B, E_K(\text{Sig}_B(g^b, g^a))$
  3.  $A \rightarrow B: \text{Cert}_A, E_K(\text{Sig}_A(g^a, g^b))$
  - ▶ key agreement and authentication of participants
  - ▶ the shared secret  $K = g^{ab}$
  - ▶  $\text{Sig}_U$  denotes signature produced by user  $U$
  - ▶ certificates contain public keys for verifying signatures
  - ▶  $E$  is symmetric encryption and “proves” the possession of  $K$

# DH protocol without PKI or preshared secret – Signal

- ▶ safety number (QR code and  $2 \times 30$ -digit numbers) per conversation
- ▶ hash of “stable identity” and “public key” (local and remote party)
- ▶ legacy format: phone numbers and public keys
- ▶ legacy format: account IDs and public keys

*This allows users to check the privacy of their communication with a contact and helps protect against any attempted man-in-the-middle attacks.*

*If the safety number is identical then you can be sure that you are communicating with the right person.*



# DH protocol without PKI or preshared secret – Telegram

- ▶ End-to-End Encryption, Secret Chats

*Secret chats are meant for people who want more secrecy than the average fella.*

- ▶ DH in modular groups (2048-bit prime, computation in a subgroup)

- ▶ Key visualization (picture), hash of the initial shared key

*Since all re-keying instances are carried over the secure channel established when the secret chat is created, it is necessary for the user to confirm that no MITM attack had taken place during the initial exchange.*

- ▶ Notable detail:

*Both clients are to check that  $g$ ,  $g_a$  and  $g_b$  are greater than one and smaller than  $p - 1$ . We recommend checking that  $g_a$  and  $g_b$  are between  $2^{2048-64}$  and  $p - 2^{2048-64}$  as well.*

source and more info: <https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-end>



# Interlock protocol

- ▶ idea: let's force the MITM attacker to be “active” in the communication
- ▶ scenarios (possible MITM attack):
  - ▶ after unauthenticated DH protocol
  - ▶ after unauthenticated distribution of key using asymmetric encryption
- ▶  $A/B$  wants to send a message  $m_A/m_B$  to  $B/A$
- ▶ both encrypt their message and exchange halves of the ciphertexts ( $c_A/c_B$ ), and then the other halves:
  1.  $A \rightarrow B: c_{A1}$  (first half of  $c_A$ )
  2.  $B \rightarrow A: c_{B1}$  (first half of  $c_B$ )
  3.  $A \rightarrow B: c_{A2}$  (second half of  $c_A$ )
  4.  $B \rightarrow A: c_{B2}$  (second half of  $c_B$ )
- ▶ a half of the ciphertext should be useless for the recipient
  - ▶ e.g. even/odd bits, encryption combined with MAC, ...

## Interlock protocol (2)

- ▶ assume MITM attacker  $M$  and keys  $K_A$  and  $K_B$  used for  $A \leftrightarrow M$  and  $M \leftrightarrow B$  communications, respectively
- ▶  $M$  can send the original message to  $A$  or  $B$  but not both
- ▶ example (sending  $m_B$  to  $A$ )
  1.  $A \rightarrow M(B): c_{A1}$  (first half of  $c_A$ )
  2.  $M(A) \rightarrow B: c'_{A1}$  (first half of  $c'_A$ , for some made-up  $m'_A$ )
  3.  $B \rightarrow M(A): c_{B1}$  (first half of  $c_B$ )
  4.  $M(A) \rightarrow B: c'_{A2}$  (second half of  $c'_A$ )
  5.  $B \rightarrow M(A): c_{B2}$  (second half of  $c_B$ ,  $M$  can decrypt  $m_B$ )
  6.  $M(B) \rightarrow A: c'_{B1}$  (first half of  $c'_B$ ,  $M$  encrypts  $m_B$  with  $K_A$ )
  7.  $A \rightarrow M(B): c_{A2}$  (second half of  $c_A$ ,  $M$  can decrypt  $m_A$ )
  8.  $M(B) \rightarrow A: c'_{B2}$  (second half of  $c'_B$ ,  **$A$  decrypts  $m_B$** )
- ▶ Can we detect made-up messages?
  - ▶ phones – reading aloud the messages from interlock protocol or session-key checksum (voice synthesis ?)

# Dolev-Yao model

- ▶ the adversary controls the network completely
  - ▶ eavesdrop, forge, delete, inject, replay, redirect messages
  - ▶ perform any computation with data (and keys) learned or possessed
- ▶ very strong (but appropriate) model
- ▶ protocol secure in DY model will be secure also in a weaker model
- ▶ sometimes weaker model is assumed in practice:
  - ▶ verification SMS sent to a mobile phone
- ▶ we will assume DY model in this lecture

# Assumptions

- ▶ ideal cryptography:
  - ▶ perfect encryption, signatures, hash functions, message authentication codes, random number generators etc.
  - ▶ even more, e.g. encrypted messages cannot be manipulated without detection, no info about message without a key, tuples with two or three messages cannot be confused etc.
- ▶ flawless implementation (see history of problems in SSL/TLS)
  - ▶ instantiation of crypto algorithms (e.g. oracle padding attacks (POODLE), combination with compression (CRIME, BREACH))
  - ▶ getting implementation right (e.g. Heartbleed, export versions of algorithms, timing attacks, Bleichenbacher's attack)
- ▶ even then the analysis is non-trivial

# What is wrong with this protocol?

- ▶  $A$  generates a session-key  $K$  and sends it encrypted and signed to  $B$
- ▶ one-way authentication and key distribution
  1.  $A \rightarrow B: E_B(A, B, K), \text{Sig}_A(E_B(A, B, K))$ 
    - ▶ assumptions:  $A$  knows the public key of  $B$  (for asymmetric encryption),  $B$  knows the public key of  $A$  (for signature verification)
    - ▶  $B$  verifies the signature and decrypts  $K$
- ▶ the problem: replay attack
  - ▶ after  $K$  leaks the attacker can replay the message
  - ▶  $B$  is tricked into using  $K$  as a good key for communication with  $A$

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# Freshness of messages

- ▶ prevention of replay attacks: nonces and timestamps
- ▶ nonce
  - ▶ usually sufficiently long random string/number (i.e. unpredictable); (sometimes “unique” is sufficient)
  - ▶ used just for a particular instance of the protocol
  - ▶ unlikely to be present in some previous instances of the protocol
  - ▶ usually the confidentiality is not needed
  - ▶ examples: SSL/TLS, IKEv2
- ▶ timestamp
  - ▶ sufficiently precise time information included into a message
  - ▶ somewhat synchronized clocks are required
  - ▶ clock manipulation should be prevented
  - ▶ example: Kerberos

# Needham-Schroeder protocol

- ▶ the protocol uses trusted third party – server  $S$ 
  - ▶  $S$  shares symmetric keys with participants ( $K_U$  with participant  $U$ )
- ▶ participants  $A$  and  $B$
- ▶ goals: authentication and distribution of a session-key  $K_{AB}$
- ▶ assumptions:  $N_A/N_B$  nonces generated by  $A/B$ ,
- ▶ the protocol:
  1.  $A \rightarrow S: A, B, N_A$
  2.  $S \rightarrow A: \{N_A, K_{AB}, B, \{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_B}\}_{K_A}$
  3.  $A \rightarrow B: \{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_B}$
  4.  $B \rightarrow A: \{N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$
  5.  $A \rightarrow B: \{N_B - 1\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ▶ positives:  $S$  involved only once, stateless, ...
- ▶ insecure!



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- ▶ positives:  $S$  involved only once, stateless, ...
- ▶ insecure!

# Attacking Needham-Schroeder protocol

- ▶ attack found by Denning and Sacco
- ▶ weakness:  $B$  cannot verify the freshness of  $K_{AB}$
- ▶ the attacker can force  $B$  to accept a compromised  $K_{AB}$  (by cryptanalysis or by leak)
- ▶ the attack ( $M$  knows  $K_{AB}$  and thus (s)he can finish the protocol):
  3.  $M(A) \rightarrow B: \{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_B}$  (replay of old message)
  4.  $B \rightarrow M(A): \{N'_B\}_{K_{AB}}$
  5.  $M(A) \rightarrow B: \{N'_B - 1\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ▶ How to fix the protocol?
  - ▶ e.g.  $A$  requests  $N_B$  from  $B$  at the beginning

# Attacks

- ▶ examples:
  - ▶ Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol (1978) – attack, Lowe (1995)
  - ▶ various weaknesses in real-world protocols: PTP, SSL/TLS, ...
  - ▶ WPA 4-way handshake (802.11i, 2004) - attack, Vanhoef (2017)
- ▶ Weaknesses/attack types
  - ▶ replay attacks
  - ▶ imprecise description
  - ▶ implementation issues
  - ▶ symmetry of messages
  - ▶ variable length of objects
  - ▶ interaction of protocols, etc.
- ▶ usually a combination of weaknesses and attack techniques

# Replay attack

- ▶ “classic” example: Needham-Schroeder protocol
- ▶ Wide mouth frog protocol
  1.  $A \rightarrow S : A, \{T_A, B, K\}_{K_A}$
  2.  $S \rightarrow B : \{T_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$
- ▶ notation and assumptions:
  - ▶  $S$  – trusted third party / server
  - ▶  $K_A / K_B$  – symmetric key shared between  $A$  and  $T$  or  $B$  and  $T$
  - ▶  $T_A / T_S$  – time-stamp produced by  $A$  and  $T$ , respectively
- ▶ objectives:
  - ▶ distribution of session-key  $K$
  - ▶ authentication of  $A$  ( $B$  is authenticated after the use of  $K$ )

# Attacking WMF

- ▶ attack – repeating messages, employing their symmetry, and using  $T$  as an oracle:

1.  $A \rightarrow S :$        $A, \{T_A, B, K\}_{K_A}$
2.  $S \rightarrow B :$        $\{T_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$
3.  $E(B) \rightarrow S :$     $B, \{T_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$
4.  $S \rightarrow E(A) :$     $\{T'_S, B, K\}_{K_A}$
5.  $E(A) \rightarrow S :$     $A, \{T'_S, B, K\}_{K_A}$
6.  $S \rightarrow E(B) :$     $\{T''_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$

...

refreshing the time-stamp

after obtaining  $K$  (leak, cryptanalysis):

- 1'.  $E(A) \rightarrow S :$     $A, \{T_S^*, B, K\}_{K_A}$
- 2'.  $S \rightarrow B :$        $\{T_S^{**}, A, K\}_{K_B}$

- ▶ fix: break the symmetry, e.g. add sender's identifier (or message number) into the second message

# Attacking WMF

- ▶ attack – repeating messages, employing their symmetry, and using  $T$  as an oracle:

1.  $A \rightarrow S : A, \{T_A, B, K\}_{K_A}$
2.  $S \rightarrow B : \{T_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$
3.  $E(B) \rightarrow S : B, \{T_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$
4.  $S \rightarrow E(A) : \{T'_S, B, K\}_{K_A}$
5.  $E(A) \rightarrow S : A, \{T'_S, B, K\}_{K_A}$
6.  $S \rightarrow E(B) : \{T''_S, A, K\}_{K_B}$

...

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- ▶ Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol (1978)
  1.  $A \rightarrow B : \{A, N_A\}_{K_B}$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N_B\}_{K_A}$
  3.  $A \rightarrow B : \{N_B\}_{K_B}$
- ▶ notation and assumptions:
  - ▶  $K_A / K_B$  –  $A$ 's /  $B$ 's public key
  - ▶  $N_A / N_B$  – nonce produced by  $A / B$
- ▶ objectives:
  - ▶ mutual (two-way) authentication of  $A$  and  $B$
  - ▶  $N_A$  and  $N_B$  can be used for session-key construction

# Attacking NSPK

- ▶ attack – after initial message from  $A$ ,  $E$  starts a session with  $B$  pretending to be  $A$  (both instances complete successfully):

1.  $A \rightarrow E : \quad \{A, N_A\}_{K_E}$
- 1'.  $E(A) \rightarrow B : \quad \{A, N_A\}_{K_B}$
- 2'.  $B \rightarrow E(A) : \quad \{N_A, N_B\}_{K_A}$
2.  $E \rightarrow A : \quad \{N_A, N_B\}_{K_A}$
3.  $A \rightarrow E : \quad \{N_B\}_{K_E}$
- 3'.  $E(A) \rightarrow B : \quad \{N_B\}_{K_B}$

- ▶ fix: e.g. adding an identifier of  $B$  into the second message:

1.  $A \rightarrow B : \{A, N_A\}_{K_B}$
2.  $B \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N_B, B\}_{K_A}$
3.  $A \rightarrow B : \{N_B\}_{K_B}$



# Attacking NSPK

- ▶ attack – after initial message from  $A$ ,  $E$  starts a session with  $B$  pretending to be  $A$  (both instances complete successfully):

1.  $A \rightarrow E : \{A, N_A\}_{K_E}$
- 1'.  $E(A) \rightarrow B : \{A, N_A\}_{K_B}$
- 2'.  $B \rightarrow E(A) : \{N_A, N_B\}_{K_A}$
2.  $E \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N_B\}_{K_A}$
3.  $A \rightarrow E : \{N_B\}_{K_E}$
- 3'.  $E(A) \rightarrow B : \{N_B\}_{K_B}$

- ▶ fix: e.g. adding an identifier of  $B$  into the second message:

1.  $A \rightarrow B : \{A, N_A\}_{K_B}$
2.  $B \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N_B, B\}_{K_A}$
3.  $A \rightarrow B : \{N_B\}_{K_B}$

# Otway-Rees protocol

- ▶ Otway, Rees (1987)

1.  $A \rightarrow B : M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}$
2.  $B \rightarrow T : M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}, \{N_B, M, A, B\}_{K_B}$
3.  $T \rightarrow B : M, \{N_A, K\}_{K_A}, \{N_B, K\}_{K_B}$
4.  $B \rightarrow A : M, \{N_A, K\}_{K_A}$

- ▶ notation and assumptions:

- ▶  $T$  – trusted server
- ▶  $K_A / K_B$  – symmetric key shared between  $A / B$  and  $T$
- ▶  $N_A / N_B$  – nonce produced by  $A / B$
- ▶  $M$  – randomly chosen identifier of this protocol run

- ▶ objectives:

- ▶ distribution of session-key  $K$
- ▶ authentication of  $A$  ( $B$  is authenticated after the use of  $K$ )

# Attacking Otway-Rees protocol – attack 1

- ▶ implementation issue
- ▶ attack: improper block cipher mode – ECB:
  - ▶ let  $|N_B|$  be a multiply of block length
  - ▶ encrypted nonce can be replaced in  $\{N_B, K\}_{K_B}$
  - ▶ result: old session-key can be forced for use in a new session

## Attacking Otway-Rees protocol – attack 2

again an implementation issue

attack: improper block cipher mode – CBC:

- ▶ assumption: the plaintext  $N_B, M, A, B$  fits into 3 blocks:

$$P_1 = N_B, \quad P_2 = M, \quad P_3 = A, B.$$

- ▶ CBC: random  $IV$ , encrypted and prepended as the first block of ciphertext
- ▶ attacker  $E$  starts the first protocol instance with  $B$ :
  1.  $E \rightarrow B$ :  $M', E, B, \{N_E, M', E, B\}_{K_E}$
  2.  $B \rightarrow E(T)$ :  $M', E, B, \{N_E, M', E, B\}_{K_E}, \{N'_B, M', E, B\}_{K_B}$
- ▶  $\{N'_B, M', E, B\}_{K_B} = \{IV'\}_{K_B}, C'_1, C'_2, C'_3$

## ...attack 2 continues

- ▶  $E$  starts the second instance with  $B$ , pretending to be  $A$ :

$$1^*. E(A) \rightarrow B: M, A, B, \{N_E, M, E, B\}_{K_E}$$

$$2^*. B \rightarrow E(T): M, A, B, \{N_E, M, E, B\}_{K_E}, \{N_B, M, A, B\}_{K_B}$$

- ▶ let  $\{N_B, M, A, B\}_{K_B} = \{IV\}_{K_B}, C_1, C_2, C_3$

- ▶  $E$  modifies the intercepted message and sends to  $T$ :

$$3^*. E(B) \rightarrow T: S, E, B, \{N_E, S, E, B\}_{K_E}, X$$

where  $X = \{IV\}_{K_B}, C_1, C'_2, C'_3$

## ...attack 2 continues

- ▶ decrypting  $X$ :

$$\begin{aligned} D_{K_B}(X) &= N_B, C_1 \oplus D_{K_B}(C'_2), C'_2 \oplus D_{K_B}(C'_3) \\ &= N_B, C_1 \oplus M' \oplus C'_1, E, B. \end{aligned}$$

- ▶  $E$  sets  $S = C_1 \oplus M' \oplus C'_1$
- ▶  $3^*$  is a legitimate message from  $T$ 's point of view

$$\begin{aligned} 4^*. \quad T \rightarrow E(B) : \quad & S, \{N_E, K\}_{K_E}, \{N_B, K\}_{K_B} \\ 5^*. \quad E(T) \rightarrow B : \quad & M, \{N_E, K\}_{K_E}, \{N_B, K\}_{K_B} \\ 6^*. \quad B \rightarrow E(A) : \quad & M, \{N_E, K\}_{K_E} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ result:  $B$  thinks (s)he communicates with  $A$ ;  $E$  knows the key  $K$

fix: add some redundant data into encrypted message (e.g. hash); use MAC, authenticated encryption etc.

## ...attack 2 continues

- ▶ decrypting  $X$ :

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- ▶  $E$  sets  $S = C_1 \oplus M' \oplus C'_1$
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- ▶ result:  $B$  thinks (s)he communicates with  $A$ ;  $E$  knows the key  $K$

fix: add some redundant data into encrypted message (e.g. hash); use MAC, authenticated encryption etc.

## Imprecise description of protocol – attack 3

- ▶ let's assume that  $T$  does not check the consistence of plaintext and encrypted data

- ▶ attack:

1.  $A \rightarrow B :$        $M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}$
2.  $B \rightarrow E(T) :$     $M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}, \{N_B, M, A, B\}_{K_B}$
- 2'.  $E \rightarrow T :$        $M, A, E, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}, \{N_E, M, A, B\}_{K_E}$
- 3'.  $T \rightarrow E :$        $M, \{N_A, K\}_{K_A}, \{N_E, K\}_{K_E}$
4.  $E(B) \rightarrow A :$     $M, \{N_A, K\}_{K_A}$

- ▶ result:

- ▶  $A$  assumes to be communicating with  $B$
- ▶  $E$  impersonates  $B$  and  $E$  knows the session-key  $K$



## Improper length of objects – attack 4

- ▶ let  $|K| = |M, A, B|$ 
  1.  $A \rightarrow E(B) : M, A, B, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}$
  4.  $E(B) \rightarrow A : M, \{N_A, M, A, B\}_{K_A}$
- ▶ result:
  - ▶  $A$  assumes the communication with  $B$
  - ▶  $E$  impersonates  $B$  and  $E$  knows the “session-key” (regardless of mode used for encryption)
- ▶ general observation: messages should be bounded to the particular step of the protocol

# Symmetry of messages

- ▶ examples: NSPK protocol, WMF protocol
- ▶ usually multiple simultaneous protocol instances
- ▶ protocol for mutual authentication:
  1.  $A \rightarrow B : N_A$
  2.  $B \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N_B\}_K$
  3.  $A \rightarrow B : N_B$
- ▶ notation and assumptions:
  - ▶  $K$  – symmetric key shared between  $A$  and  $B$
  - ▶  $N_A / N_B$  – nonce generated by  $A$  and  $B$ , respectively

## Attack employing the symmetry

1.  $A \rightarrow E(B) : N_A$
  - 1'.  $E(B) \rightarrow A : N_A$
  - 2'.  $A \rightarrow E(B) : \{N_A, N'_A\}_K$
  2.  $E(B) \rightarrow A : \{N_A, N'_A\}_K$
  3.  $A \rightarrow E(B) : N'_A$
- 
- 3'.  $E(B) \rightarrow A : N'_A$

- ▶ result:  $A$  believes that (s)he communicates with  $B$
- ▶ fix:
  - ▶ restrict the number of parallel runs or keep track of recent nonces (not a good solution)
  - ▶ break the symmetry, e.g. insert participant's identifier into encrypted message

# Denning-Sacco protocol

- ▶ Denning, Sacco (1981)

1.  $A \rightarrow T : A, B$
2.  $T \rightarrow A : C_A, C_B$
3.  $A \rightarrow B : C_A, C_B, \{\{K, T_A\}_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_B}$

- ▶ notation and assumption:

- ▶  $C_A / C_B$  – public-key certificate of  $A / B$
- ▶  $T_A$  – time-stamp produced by  $A$
- ▶  $K$  – session-key generated by  $A$
- ▶  $\{X\}_{K_A^{-1}}$  – message  $X$  signed by  $A$

- ▶ objectives:

- ▶ distribution of session-key  $K$
- ▶ one-way authentication of  $A$

# Attacking Denning-Sacco protocol

Abadi (1994):

1.  $A \rightarrow T :$        $A, E$
2.  $T \rightarrow A :$        $C_A, C_E$
3.  $A \rightarrow E :$        $C_A, C_E, \{\{K, T_A\}_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_E}$
- 3'.  $E(A) \rightarrow B :$     $C_A, C_B, \{\{K, T_A\}_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_B}$

- ▶ result:  $E$  authenticates as  $A$  for  $B$  with known session-key  $K$
- ▶ fix: e.g. insert recipient identifier into the signed data

# Attacking Denning-Sacco protocol

Abadi (1994):

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- ▶ result:  $E$  authenticates as  $A$  for  $B$  with known session-key  $K$
- ▶ fix: e.g. insert recipient identifier into the signed data

# Protection of predictable data

- ▶ requesting a current time:
  1.  $A \rightarrow S : A, N_A$
  2.  $S \rightarrow A : \{T_S, N_A\}_{K_A}$
- ▶ if  $N_A$  is predictable:
  1.  $E(A) \rightarrow S : A, N_A$
  2.  $S \rightarrow E(A) : \{T_S, N_A\}_{K_A}$  (this can be use as a reply for A's request later)
- ▶ fix (doesn't work if  $N_A$  is a constant):
  1.  $A \rightarrow S : A, \{N_A\}_{K_A}$
  2.  $S \rightarrow A : \{T_S, \{N_A\}_{K_A}\}_{K_A}$

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# Formal methods for protocol security?

- ▶ formal methods and tools for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols
  - ▶ ProVerif, Scyther, OFMC, Tamarin, Verifpal ...
  - ▶ ...they help to increase our trust in protocol's security
  - ▶ what is modeled?
  - ▶ the implementation can change everything
- ▶ various protocols were analyzed formally – with some vulnerabilities found later (WPA 4-way handshake, TLS 1.3, ...)